United States Supreme Court

402 U.S. 146

Perez  v.  United States

 Argued: March 22, 1971. --- Decided: April 26, 1971

Syllabus

Petitioner was convicted of 'loan sharking' activities, i.e., unlawfully using extortionate means in collecting and attempting to collect an extension of credit, in violation of Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. He challenges the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that Congress has no power to control the local activity of loan sharking. Held: Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to control activities affecting interstate commerce and Congress' findings are adequate to support its conclusion that loan sharks who use extortionate means to collect payments on loans are in a class largely controlled by organized crime with a substantially adverse effect on interstate commerce. Pp. 149-157.

426 F.2d 1073, affirmed.

Albert J. Krieger, New York City, for petitioner.

Sol. Gen. Erwin N. Griswold, for respondent.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Notes

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