Naval historians such as Evan Mawdsley, Richard Overy, and Craig Symonds concluded that World War II's decisive victories on land could not have been won without decisive victories at sea.[1][2][3] Naval battles to keep shipping lanes open for combatant's movement of troops, guns, ammunition, tanks, warships, aircraft, raw materials, and food largely determined the outcome of land battles. Without the Allied victory in keeping shipping lanes open during the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in Europe and North Africa.[4] Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of materiel, food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union,[lower-alpha 1] her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for the Red Army to prevail at Stalingrad and Kursk.[5][6][7][8][9]

Without victories at sea in the Pacific theater, the Allies could not have mounted amphibious assaults on or maintained land forces on Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Saipan, The Philippines, Iwo Jima, or Okinawa. Allied operations in the Atlantic and Pacific war theaters were interconnected because they frequently competed for scarce naval resources for everything from aircraft carriers to transports and landing craft.[10] Effective transport of troops and military supplies between the two war theaters required naval protection for shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Suez canal, and through the Panama Canal. In both theaters, maritime dominance enabled combatants to use the sea for their own purposes and deprive its use by adversaries. As naval historian Admiral Herbert Richmond stated, "Sea power did not win the war itself: it enabled the war to be won".[11]

Aircraft carriers played a major role in winning decisive naval battles,[12] supporting key amphibious landings, and keeping critical merchant shipping lanes open for transporting military personnel and their equipment to land battle zones.

Design considerations

Aircraft carrier design involved trade-offs between offensive striking power and defensive survivability. The more carrier tonnage allocated to guns and armor for protection, the less was available for carrying and launching aircraft, the warship's principal weapon. Combatant nations of World War II placed varying emphasis on these factors depending upon conditions in their principal operating theater, their preferred operating tactics, and their industrial capability. Experts continue to debate whether increasing carrier survivability through increased anti-aircraft armament and armored flight decks was optimal during World War II since adding the weight to do so necessitated reductions in the number of carrier aircraft available to inflict damage upon the enemy. For example, would designing the USS Yorktown so that it was more likely to survive the punishment it took at the Battle of Midway have been desirable if its carrying a smaller air group resulted in fewer Japanese carriers being sunk?[13]

Initial constraints on design

Aircraft carrier design prior to the outbreak of World War II had been constrained by limitations of international agreements among the major naval powers which were intended to avoid an arms race over capital ships. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 limited individual carrier displacement for the five parties to 27,000 long tons, except that each could convert up to two existing battleship hulls to carriers with displacements up to 33,000 tons. Armament for carriers was limited to a maximum of ten guns with a maximum caliber of 8 inches (203 mm). Aircraft carriers were defined as having displacements of at least 10,000 tons and used exclusively for launching and landing aircraft. The total tonnage limit for carriers was 135,000 tons for UK and America, 81,000 for Japan, and 60,000 tons for Italy and France.[14] Any carrier built could not be replaced for twenty years but carriers already built were deemed "experimental" and could be replaced at any time. Carriers under 10,000 tons were not included in the definition. .[15]

"Experimental" designs

Only four aircraft carriers were in service or under construction at the time the Washington Naval Treaty was agreed to. These four were considered "experimental" and not included as part of the treaty's overall tonnage limitations. They were relatively small in size and carried a relatively small number of aircraft. These were HMS Argus (the first full deck aircraft carrier), USS Langley (a converted collier), IJN Hōshō (the first purpose built carrier to enter service), and HMS Hermes (the first purpose designed carrier).[lower-alpha 2]

Evolving design emphasis by each combatant

Japanese aircraft carriers

The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) emphasized offensive capability consistent with their strategic vision of orchestrating and winning a single, decisive battle. Limited by treaties to having fewer capital ships than the US and UK, Japan's planning emphasized ways to degrade enemy fleets before they arrived at battle by extending the capability of IJN weapon systems. Aircraft as well as torpedoes had longer ranges than American or British counterparts.

The following table shows some key performance parameters for Japanese aircraft carriers. Carriers are listed in order of commissioning date within each carrier type (fleet, light, escort).

Characteristics of Japanese aircraft carriers[lower-alpha 3]
Commission date[lower-alpha 4] Class Standard
displacement[lower-alpha 5]		 Length
(ft)		 Speed
(kn)		 Range
(nmi)[lower-alpha 6]		 Crew Operational

aircraft[lower-alpha 7]

 Reserve

aircraft

Lost to
Fleet carriers
1Akagi25-May-27Akagi36,500855318,2001,63066151 bomb[lower-alpha 8]
2Kaga30-Nov-29Kaga38,2008122810,0001,70872184 bombs
3Soryu29-Sep-37Soryu15,900746347,7501,1036383 bombs
4Hiryu05-Jul-39Soryu17,3007463410,3301,10357164 bombs
5Shokaku08-Aug-41Shokaku26,675845349,7001,66072124 torpedoes
6Zuikaku25-Sep-41Shokaku29,80084534--1,66072129 bombs+7 torp
7Junyo03-May-42Hiyo24,10071825.510,0001,224485--
8Hiyo31-Jul-42Hiyo26,94971825.510,0001,2244852 torpedoes
9Taiho07-Mar-44Taiho29,3008553310,0001,7517501 sub. torpedo
10Unryu06-Aug-44Unryu17,150742348,0001,5955762 sub. torpedoes
11Amagi10-Aug-44Unryu17,460742349,7001,595576many bombs
12Katsuragi15-Oct-44Unryu17,260742339,7001,595576--
13Shinano19-Nov-44Shinano64,8008732710,0002,4004704 sub. Torpedoes
Light carriers
1Hosho27-Dec-22Hosho7,470551258,680550210--
2Ryujo09-May-33Ryujo12,7325902910,0009244804 bm+1 torp
3Zuiho27-Dec-40Zuiho11,262712289,236785300many bm +2 torp
4Shoho30-Nov-41Zuiho11,262674289,23678530013 bm+7 torp
5Ryuho28-Nov-42Ryuho13,360707268,000989300--
6Chitose01-Nov-43Chitose11,1906312911,0001,5003003 torpedoes
7Chiyoda21-Dec-43Chitose11,1906312911,8101,5003004 bombs + gunfire
Escort carriers
1Taiyo15-Sep-41Taiyo17,830591218,5008502341 sub. torpedo
2Unyo31-May-42Taiyo17,830649218,5008503001 sub. torpedo
3Chuyo25-Nov-42Taiyo17,830591218,5008503002 sub. Torpedoes
4Shinyo15-Nov-43Shinyo17,500651228,0009482764 sub. Torpedoes
5Kaiyo23-Nov-43Kaiyo13,600546237,000587240bombs
RANGES
Fleet
Low15,900718267,7501,103480
High64,8008733410,0002,4007518
Light
Low7,470551258,000550210
High13,3607122911,8101,500480
Escort
Low13,600546217,000587230
High17,830651238,500948306

Notes:

  • This table includes only ships that operated between July 1937 and August 1945 and that had flight decks for both launching and recovering aircraft at sea.

American aircraft carriers

Americans perceived their principal operating theater would be the Pacific, where immense distances between refueling bases placed a premium on carrier speed and range. Threats were likely to come from other warships, either as enemy aircraft or ship's guns, rather than from land-based planes or batteries. Carrier-launched strikes would involve fewer aircraft and each would carry less of a payload, consisting of 250 lb and 500 lb bombs, compared to land-based aircraft. Also, war-games indicated the ability to strike first and decisively was important for success. Strong first strikes against enemy carriers were expected to reduce or eliminate their ability to counter-attack, reducing the need for strong defensive measures. As a result of these considerations, Americans placed greater emphasis on aircraft striking power than upon survivability when attacked. Accordingly, carriers were designed to carry more aircraft and aircraft components at the expense of more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor. To further increase the number of aircraft carried, large numbers of them were kept on the flight deck in addition to those kept below in hangars. In the Pacific, storms that could toss or wash deck-park aircraft overboard were uncommon and could theoretically be navigated around. Finally, within a year of the beginning of the Pacific War, America's industrial capacity enabled them to rapidly make good their carrier losses, enabling them to take greater risks with their carriers to achieve greater success.[13]

British aircraft carriers

The British also operated in the Pacific but, for most of the war, their principal areas of carrier operation were the coastal Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea. In these areas, there were no enemy carriers. The threat was from land-based, potentially multi-engine, heavy bombers in potentially overwhelming numbers that could deliver heavy payloads consisting of 1,000 lb bombs or more and be protected by equally large numbers of fighter aircraft. Unlike with relatively few and small enemy attacking aircraft in the Pacific, it was almost assured that some attacking aircraft would penetrate a fighter and anti-aircraft screen. Further, attacks from land bases could be sustained after airfield repairs, unlike in the Pacific where the launch platform could be sunk or sufficiently damaged to require an immediate return to dry-dock facilities. Accordingly, emphasis was placed on surviving an attack such that a counter-attack could be launched. Survivability was enhanced with more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor at the expense of larger aircraft groups on board. Additional anti-aircraft armament also made carriers more self-sufficient for defense and less reliant upon other warships for screening. Finally, heavy weather was more common and less avoidable in the Atlantic theater than in the Pacific. and deck-parking to increase aircraft group size was less common.[13]

All carriers

The table below shows the specifications and capabilities for aircraft carriers of all combatants as they evolved over time. During the war, warships received modifications and upgrades, including increasing anti-aircraft guns. There were other aircraft carrier designs built during the war which only entered service just prior to or after the end of hostilities such as the British Light Fleet Carrier, or the US Midway-class. There were also cancelled carriers such as the French Joffre-class, British Malta-class, the German "Aircraft carrier II" or Jade-class.

Carrier Date commissioned Carrier class Country Standard displacement (t) Full displacement (t) Length w/l
(ft)		 Length o/a
(ft)		 Beam o/a
(ft)		 Draft
(ft)		 Speed (kn) Range (nmi) H. AA L. AA Belt Arm. Deck Arm. Aircraft Crew
HMS Argus 1918 UK14,68016,0285656823203,600615-18495
USS Langley 1922Langley US12,90014,1005426525163,500436631
IJN Hōshō CVL 1922 Japan7,5909,6465525920258,680615512
HMS Hermes CVL 1923 UK11,02013,9006007023255,60093120566
HMS Eagle 1924converted battleship UK22,20066811527244,800144.51-1.525-30791
HMS Furious 1925modified Courageous UK22,90026,0007878825307,480162-3.8-336795
IJN Akagi 1927 Japan37,10042,000855103293210,000121463.1661,630
USS Saratoga 1927Lexington US37,00043,746888106303310,000205-7.8-2782,791
USS Lexington 1927Lexington US37,00048,500888108333310,000205-7.8-2782,791
Béarn 1927 France22,50129,00059911631227,00014163.1135-40865
HMS Courageous 1928Courageous UK24,60027,4207357869128306,630162-3.8-3481,217
IJN Kaga 1929 Japan38,81381233312810,000262261.5901,708
HMS Glorious 1930Courageous-class UK25,37027,8597357879128305,860162-3.8-1481,283
IJN Ryujo CVL 1933Japan7,9009,99059067182910,000122448600
USS Ranger 1934 US14,81017,859730769109222910,00084021*862,461
IJN Sōryū 1937 Japan16,20019,1007487025347,75061463+91,100
USS Yorktown 1937Yorktown US20,10025,900825109263312,5008402.5-480-902,217
USS Enterprise 1938Yorktown US19,80025,500770825110263312,5008402.5-4902,217
HMS Ark Royal 1938 UK22,00028,1607228009528307,60016644.5.8-3.550-601,580
IJN Hiryū 1939Japan17,60029,57074673263410,33012213.5-61-2.264+91,100
USS Wasp 1940WaspUS14,90019,423688741109203012,0008303.51002,167
HMS Illustrious 1940Illustrious UK23,36971074096293010,70016484.53.036-571,299
HMS Formidable 1940Illustrious UK23,36971074096293010,70016484.53.036-571,299
IJN Shōkaku 1941Shōkaku Japan26,08732,62084585349,7001632721,660
USS Essex 1942Essex US27,50036,9608721483320,00012783-41.5952,600
HMS Implacable 1944Implacable UK32,63076796336,720161044.53.048-812,300

SELECTED ESCORT CARRIERS

Long Island aircraft: 16 hangar + 46 flight deck Audacity: no hangar; aircraft stored on flight deck

Carrier Name Date Comm. Carrier Class Std. Displ Full Displ Length f/d Length o/a Beam o/a Draft Speed (kn) Range (nmi) H. AA L. AA Belt Arm. Deck Arm. Air- craft Men
USS Long IslandJune 1941Long Island40449270251710,00062856
HMS AudacityJune 1941converted cargo liner12,000450467562815196+8480
IJN TaiyōSep 1941Taiyō18,11620,3215917325218,50081427-30850
IJN Un'yōMay 1942Taiyō18,11620,3215917325218830850
USS SangamonAugust 1942Sangamon11,60024,665553114321822025830
USS BogueSeptember 1942Bogue[lower-alpha 9]9,8004961122618224890
IJN ChūyōNovember 1942Taiyō18,1165917325218,5008830850
USS CasablancaJul 1943Casablanca7,90011,077490 w/l49865-108221910,24012027916
HMS Pretoria CastleJuly 1943[lower-alpha 10]converted liner23,45059476291821
IJN Shin'yōNovember 1943converted liner17,50020,58662126262283027+6942
IJN KaiyōNovember 194313,60016,4835467126237,00082424829
HMS VindexDecember 1943Nairana13,67152468211723215-20700
HMS NairanaDec 1943Nairana14,28052969211723215-20728
USS Commencement BayNov 1944Commencement Bay11,1005577531236341,066

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Britain and America shipped war-sustaining goods to the Soviet Union via Arctic Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Pacific Ocean routes.
  2. ↑ construction of Hermes started in 1918 but her design was being modified as a result of experiments with Argus and Eagle; the last revisions made in 1921 and it was not commissioned until 1924 [16]
  3. ↑ Values shown here are typically for the 1942 to 1944 time frame
  4. ↑ The date first commissioned as an aircraft carrier
  5. ↑ the weight - in tons - of the ship with full load of stores and ammunition, but with no fuel, lubricating oil, or reserve feed water.[17]
  6. ↑ the maximum distance in nautical miles possible on a load of fuel at optimal speed, which is typically much less than maximum speed.
  7. ↑ the number that could be launched for attacks or combat air patrol. It excludes spares and cargo aircraft.[18]
  8. ↑ Set fires which became out of control. Scuttled the following day
  9. ↑ Attacker-class in British service
  10. ↑ used for trials and training only

Citations

  1. ↑ Mawdsley, Evan (2019). The War For The Seas- A Maritime History of World War II. London: Yale University Press. p. 478. ISBN 978-0-300-19019-9.
  2. ↑ Overy, p. 61
  3. ↑ Symonds, Craig L. (2018). World War II At Sea. United States: Oxford University Press. p. 641. ISBN 9780190243678.
  4. ↑ Overy, Richard (1995). Why The Allies Won. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. p. 18. ISBN 0-393-03925-0.
  5. ↑ Overy p. 19, 254, 321
  6. ↑ Mawdsley, p.478
  7. ↑ Baranov, Sergey (14 March 2018). "Lend-Lease: How American supplies aided the USSR in its darkest hour". Russia Beyond. TV-Novosti. Archived from the original on 2016-03-20. Retrieved 29 August 2019.
  8. ↑ Hill, Alexander (July 2008). "Did Russia Really Go It Alone- How Lend-Lease Helped The Soviets Defeat The Germans". History.net. Retrieved 28 Aug 2019.
  9. ↑ Toland, John (1965). The Last 100 Days. New York, NY & Toronto, Canada: Bantam Books. p. 102. ISBN 0-553-34208-8.
  10. ↑ Symonds, WWII at Sea, p. xi-xii
  11. ↑ Mawdsley, page=xxxix, 477
  12. ↑ Symonds, p. 268
  13. 1 2 3 Pocklington, Alexander (aka "Drachinifel") (2 Jan 2019). "'Armoured' and 'Unarmoured' Carriers: Survivability vs. Strike Power". Five Minute Guide To Warships WWI & WWII (more or less). Retrieved 31 Mar 2019 – via YouTube.
  14. ↑ DiGiulian, Tony (29 December 2017). "Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922". NavWeaps. Retrieved 31 Mar 2019.
  15. ↑ Article XX part 4, Article VIII
  16. ↑ Friedman, 1988 p83-84
  17. ↑ Stille, p. 61
  18. ↑ Parshall and Tully, p. 478

References

    • Chen, C. Peter. "World War II Database". Lava Development. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
    • Cocker, Maurice (2008). Aircraft-Carrying Ships of the Royal Navy. Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-4633-2.
    • Friedman, Norman (1988). British Carrier Aviation: the Evolution of the Ships and their Aircraft. London: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 978-0-85177-488-6.
    • Parshall, Jonathan B.; Tully, Anthony P. (2005). Shattered Sword. United States: Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-923-0.
    • Stille, Mark (2013). The Imperial Japanese Navy In The Pacific War. New York, NY: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4728-0146-3.
    • Symonds, Craig L. (2018). World War II At Sea. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190243678.
    • Tully, Anthony (27 September 2021). "Kido Butai!- Stories and Battle Histories of the IJN's Carrier Fleet". Imperial Japanese Navy Page. CombinedFleet.com. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
    • "DANFS Online- The Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships". Haze Gray & Underway. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
    • "Guide for individual ships histories". Naval War In The Pacific, 1941-1945. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
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