brute-fact

brute-fact (not comparable)

1. brute fact (when used attributively)
   • 1982: Nicholas Rescher [ed.], American Philosophical Quarterly, volume 19, page 215 (Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh)

     The fact that we can agree about veridical perceptions with others possessing similar conceptual schemas is strong evidence that the brute-fact features of our perceptual experience have an important correlation with a certain given […]

   • 2008: Adrian Haddock [ed.] and Fiona Macpherson [ed.], Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, page 220 (Oxford University Press; →ISBN, 9780199231546)

     I’ll call the third proposal for what grounds the Positive Epistemic Fact the brute-fact proposal, because it gives the Positive Epistemic Fact the status of brute fact.