A prince, although a new one, will maintain himself as easily in his states as he who reigns by hereditary right, if he follows the maxims I have laid down ; and his situation is perhaps preferable in certain respects to that of the hereditary prince, because as we pay more attention to the conduct of a new prince, if he governs with wisdom, his merit will conciliate the esteem and affection of the penple more than any legitimate right of dominion^{[primus 1]}. It is besides well known ​that men think much more of the present than the past, and do not seek to change when they find themselves comfortable. A prince who performs well his duties need never fear the want ​of defenders : his recent elevation, so far from being a motive for esteeming him less, will, on the contrary, double his glory, on account of the obstacles he has had to conquer, and which his merit alone has enabled him to surmount. So much as his reign acquires eclat by the good laws which he has established, by the institution of a national militia, the valuable friends he has made, and by brilliant exploits, so much he who loses hereditary states, and through his own fault; is inconsiderate and disgraceful.

If we examine the conduct of the King of Naples, the Duke of Miļan, and others, who have lost their dominions in aur tine, we shall find they have all committed a grand fault in neglecting to institute a national militia. Nay, more, they appeared to give themselves no trouble to gain the ​affections of the people and the friendship of tlie nobles, for errors of this kind alone can lose a state capable of bringing an army into the field. Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but him who was defeated by Titus Quintius, was possessed of only a petty state, if compared with the territories of either Rome or Greece, whose combined effects he had to withstand; yet he resisted those great powers, and during the several years that the war lasted he lost only a few towns; but this prince was a warrior, and besides he knew how to make himself beloved by the peo- ple and esteemed by the great. It is not therefore to fortune that the princes of Italy ought to attribute the loss of their states, but to their cowardice and want of foresight. For they were so far from believing such a revolution in their fortunes, which is commonly the case with governments whose tranquillity has not been disturbed for some time, that when they saw the enemy approach they fled instead of defending themselves, vainly fancying that the people would feel impatient under the insolence of a conqueror, and not delay to recal them. This system, in default of every other resource, is undoubtedly good; but it is most shameful in a prince thus to neglect the honourable means of endeavouring to preserve his states, and ignobly fly, in the hope that you will recal him, though he has deserted you: a hope ridiculous and ​vain, but even, were it well founded, he who counts on foreign aid will find a master in his defender. It is in himself and in his own courage that a prince ought to seek ręsources against the reverses of fortune.