we take into view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion, as has been fully shown in another place, the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.

1 No. XXVIt.

BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

TJie subject continued^ with the same view.

IT has been urged, in different shapes, that a consti- tution of the kind proposed by the convention, cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general asser- tion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible designa- tion of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a pre-supposition, that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of federal authority, in any matter of an internal nature. Waving a,ny exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy, or inexplicitness, of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to pre-sup- pose that disinclination in the people. Unless we pre- sume, at the same time, that the powers of the general government will be worse administered than those of the state governments, there seems to be no room for the presumption of ill will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule, thajt their confidence in, and their obedience to, a govern- ment, will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted, that there are exceptions to this rule ; but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and maxims.