ones. Persons in whom sentiment and feeling greatly exceed thought and reflection, and who therefore rest upon sentiment rather than upon thought, may not be conscious of any change like what we have described. They are more poetic than philosophic.

Such is a very hasty and imperfect outline of the transition from dogmatism to faith. M. Jouffroy, after having reviewed the four systems of Philosophy, which in one way or another make Ethics impossible, proceeds to examine the various false and imperfect systems of Ethics which have been taught. He first reviews the selfish system. He takes it as developed and taught by Hobbes and Bentham. This system is psychologically wrong, inasmuch as it fails to recognise the generous and benevolent impulses, and any of the facts of the spiritual development. So radical a defect must of course spoil the system, even if it do not make it positively mischievous. These teachers recognise no higher motive than self love, and no higher law than self-interest well understood. This is the very lowest view that any one who had any portion, however small, of human nature within him could possibly take.

Our author then passes to a consideration of those systems which recognise disinterested motives,—motives that are distinct from self-love,—and of these he first considers the sentimental system. This system was developed and taught by Adam Smith. It is usually called the system of sympathy. Smith taught that the essence of morality could consist only in such actions, as could be generally approved of. By sympathy we put ourselves in the condition of others, and judge impartially of the propriety of their actions. From this impartial judgment we infer the general rule of action. Hence the rule of this system would be, act so as that others will sympathize with you, and approve of what you do. In other words, it would say, “All things whatsoever ye would that others should do unto you, do ye even so unto them.” A great advance was herein made upon the selfish system. The fact of disinterestedness had been recognised. But we easily see the defects of this system. Its psychological defect is, that it does not recognise all of the impulses as motives to action, (and they are certainly right and proper