J. M. WILSON AND T. FOWLEE, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 593

same page we read : "It will be plain, from what I have said in this and the preceding chapters, that I do not agree with Prof. Sidgwick (Methods of Ethics, bk. i., c. 3) in regarding the idea con- noted by these terms (i.e., ' ought ' and ' duty') as ultimate and unanalysable". I cannot but feel that in this last statement Prof. Fowler is making a somewhat large demand upon the sagacity of his readers. To my own mind it would have been by no means plain that he had even intended to analyse the ' ought ' into something else. The passage in the text might well have been written by Dr. Martineau ; it might have been subscribed to (though he would have expressed himself differently) by Prof. T. H. Green. For the ' analysis ' of the ' ought ' is merely appa- rent ; it has been made to disappear only by the use of words which imply it. To say that an " obligation is imposed upon us" is only another way of saying 'we are obliged'. And what is to "pass a sentence of approval" upon an action but to say that it ought to be done ? I am aware, of course, that Prof. Fowler would not regard these objections as unanswerable. He would urge, for instance, that, in his view, moral obligation flows from the "particular nature" of man, while the Idealist regards it as flowing from the " eternal and necessary relations of things". Fully to examine the validity of this distinction would occupy more space than I have at my disposal. I can only point out the consequences of a logical acceptance of Prof. Fowler's position (p. 261) that " the majesty of the moral law, if that be regarded as the source of moral obligation, implies, on our part, a recognition of that law, a reverence for it, and a willingness to conform our actions to its requirements ". Does Prof. Fowler mean to say that the obliga- tion or "majesty" of the moral law disappears when we are un- willing to recognise it ? Or if the obligation is made to consist wholly in the penalties annexed to its non-performance, does he not fall at once into that pure Hedonism against which, alike in its theological and its untheological forms, he elsewhere vigorously protests ? For the rest, I gladly acknowledge that Prof. Fowler has made some real contributions towards a reconciliation of conflicting theories towards what I may call the moralisation of the aggres- sive Utilitarianism of Bentham and his disciples. Except where he catches a sight of the red rag of " Metaphysics," or the a priori, Prof. Fowler is willing enough to incorporate "intuitional" elements into his teaching, though when he does so he shows an almost amusing eagerness to make his apologies to those whom he regards as his philosophical forefathers. " The sympathetic affec- tions "are declared to be " coeval with the human race, or, at all events, with the time when man first deserved to be called by his pre- sent name " (ii. 75) . On the question whether the altruistic affections were gradually evolved out of the egoistic, Prof. Fowler suspends his judgment, and enters a protest against what he calls " specu-