40 PEOF. H. SIDGWICK :

though I should say that we still approve of the act. We think that the veracious agent has willed what he ought to have willed, though he ought to have willed something else too, viz., the suppression of the bad motive so far, at least, as it was within his power to suppress it while doing the act. I introduce this last qualification,, because I think that it is not always within the power of the will and therefore not always strictly a duty to get rid of an objec- tionable motive. Take the case of the motive which Dr. Martineau places last, Vindictiveness, or the desire of malevolent pleasure. Bentham and Sir James Stephen l regard it as an important part of the benefits of criminal law that it provides the " pleasure of revenge," or, as Sir J. Stephen says, a "legi- timate satisfaction for the passion of revenge ". These phrases, I think, give some offence to our common moral consciousness ; and, in my Methods of Ethics, I have suggested that " perhaps we may distinguish between the impulse to inflict pain and the desire of the antipathetic pleasure which the agent will reap from this infliction, and approve the for- mer in certain circumstances, but condemn the latter abso- lutely ". I suggest this, however, with some hesitation, on account of the great difficulty of separating the two impulses. A man under the influence of a strong passion of resentment can hardly exclude from his mind altogether an anticipation of the pleasure that he will feel when the passion is gratified ; and, if so, he can hardly exclude altogether the desire of this gratification. It is, I think, clear to common sense that a man ought not to cherish this desire, to gloat over the antici- pated gratification ; but it is, perhaps, too severe to say that the desire of malevolent pleasure should be excluded alto- gether. If, as Sir James Stephen says, the " deliberate satisfaction which criminal law affords to the desire of ven- geance " excited by gross crimes is an indispensable means of preventing such crimes human nature being what it is ; if it is important for the well-being of society that men should derive " hearty satisfaction " from the hanging of a cold-blooded murderer, or the infliction of penal servitude on an unscrupulous swindler ; then it is, perhaps, going too far to condemn absolutely the desire of this satisfaction. In any case, it seems to me contrary to common sense to say that the prosecution of such a murderer or swindler becomes a bad act if the prosecutor is conscious of desiring the male- volent pleasure that he will receive from the criminal's punishment : we commonly judge such an act to be right,. 1 Cp. General View of the Criminal Law of England, cL. iv.