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W. KNIGHT, HUME. 443

a doctrine of sensation, might be worked out without physio- logical references. But, in point of fact, nobody thinks of working out any such theory ; and, as everybody does import just as much physiological statement as is found necessary or possible or, it may be, convenient, the plain course is to do it with sufficient warning and explanation from the beginning. Prof. Dewey does not do enough in this way for the help of students. Learners, at least if left to themselves with his book, would, I imagine, find it hard enough to connect with his introductory view of Mind in general the doctrine of Sense to which they find themselves straightway conveyed ; and I say this without ignoring the section soon inserted on " Belation of the Physical Factor to the Psy- chical ". (In this, by the way, should not " Psychological Objec- tion," at p. 41, be called Metaphysical rather?) On the general question of psychological explanation, I close with the remark, that if it is to come only, as Prof. Dewey urges, by resort to the Physiological or more properly (in the wider sense of the word) Psychophysical and Comparative Methods, there would need to be a good deal more both of psychophysical and of comparative statement forthcoming than he has anywhere provided in his book. Nobody could put more impressively than he does the helplessness of both methods apart from the data yielded by Introspection ; and he has himself given throughout the work the best proof that the Introspective Method is by no means so helpless to explain as, at the one place before noted, he too incautiously avers. It should be added that every chapter is followed by a most useful conspectus of the related psycho- logical literature. EDITOR> Hume. By WILLIAM KNIGHT, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews. (" Philo- sophical Classics for English Eeaders.") Edinburgh and London : William Blackwood & Sons, 1886. Pp. x., 239. This little volume is, as we learn from the preface, the precursor to a more extensive work on Hume by the same author, and it would have appeared earlier but for the difficulty of reducing it to such a form that it might neither anticipate the larger book nor lose interest through undue reservation of material. It consists of an interesting narrative of Hume's life, and of a critical account of his philosophy, metaphysical and ethical, which is prefaced in each case by a historical review of his predecessors. Some inaccuracies, mostly due to inadvertence, are noticeable in the biographical sketch. Of these, the most serious occurs p. 51, where we are told that "when we view Hume's work in the light of the subsequent evolution of European thought, we see that it is upon the Treatise, and not upon the Inquiry^ that

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