386 j. DEWEY :

whether of perception or of reasoning, are of no account to intelligence except as they lead to meaning. Perception is well denned as unconscious reasoning. And as such it illustrates the way in which the process loses itself in the result. The process is nothing as a process, or psychical existence ; it is everything in what it means or symbolises. In reasoning proper, the processes are of some account to us, because we know that upon variations in the process depend variations in result. The matter is more complex, and we go through it step by step ; but even here we do not pay attention to the process as an existence. We simply take one meaning at a time, and then go on to the next meaning. Reasoning is the way in which we separate and unite meanings into one complex meaning. As our power to reason becomes developed, and the subject-matter be- comes familiar, we cease considering the various subordinate meanings in their relation to each other. We grasp the meaning as a whole, as we do in perception, and reasoning becomes, as we say, automatic or intuitive. Conversely, when we are in doubt in perception as to whether the result is genuine or is an illusion, we do pay attention to the process. We repeat the process, analysing it into its steps, to see if we have drawn a correct inference. So, when we wish to decide whether that red colour is really on the wall or is due to a purely organic affection, we move the body or head, and observe results, and draw our inference accord- ingly. We often separate the various steps in perception, just as we often consolidate them in reasoning ; but the separation and the consolidation are always of meaning, and never of the psychical process as an existence. But let us consider another example or two of the fact that we neglect sensuous basis and regard meaning alone. Everyone knows that we have two retinal images of an object in every case of binocular vision ; that is to say, we have two complete sensuous outfits. In the vast majority of cases, these two sensuous bases are slightly different ; in one case in a thousand they may be alike. Yet we are ordinarily conscious of but one object ; in some cases, those where the retinal images are similar, we can be conscious of but one, do what we will. I know of no more striking illustration of the fact that sensations, as existences, are nothing for us, while sensations in their symbolic function are for us everything. The sensations mean but one object, and, do what we will, we see but one object. The duality of the sensation is nothing for us. But we neglect the greater part of the case, when we speak of the matter as