380 F. H. BRADLEY :

and so far there is no blending. It is the basis of the sug- gestion which is presented also in the picture, and, by blending, that basis overpowers what is given, partly drives off its detail, and substitutes in part or altogether the detail of the idea. I am far from wishing to underrate the work done by redintegration, but though that work is essential, yet in some respects, and particularly when volition comes in, it is not enough. In the use of blending we must of course see that there are elements to blend ; but with that precaution our psychology would, I think, find it a key to unlock several puzzles. The failure of psychology with regard to the creative imagination can, I think, in part be so removed. And at all events, in my judgment, blending explains the origin of voluntary analysis. There are other difficulties which, no doubt, will occur to the reader. If I had space I am confident that I could deal with most of them ; but in conclusion I can do no more than sum up the distinctive features of thought. Thought is first not the whole psychological process. There are always other elements which compete with it for existence within the subject. And so thought is objective, not because its content excludes the self, but because it has to control tendencies which fall outside itself, and solely in the course of my psychical events. Thought is ' normative,' because its process has a standard and end. The result produced by that movement becomes a principle which itself moves, first unawares and then with slowly increasing self-con- sciousness. And this end struggles both for room to exist within my mind, and strives also against its own defects and failures. Thought once more is " necessary," because its end is able to compel. Within itself one element is because of another, and outside itself it can force competing tendencies. And it is " universal," assuredly not because always abstract, nor again because always possible for more men than one, but because its connexions are independent of this or that man's private liking, and transcend the immediate deUver- ance of sense. And it is an obvious " activity," because succeeding it expands the group of the self, and that expansion in its origin and its result is attributed to the subject. Its end, Individuality, must gain all its material from the flux of presentation, but from the very start it ignores 'thisness'. Irrespective of the moment's confused deliverance, the content it takes up is applied to qualify every other context. That what is must be and is eternal, is the principle of all our psychical movement ; and this builds up not thought only, but emotion and will. Thought, however,