ASSOCIATION AND THOUGHT. 379

In discrimination we get a result of variety in unity, and when we go about to distinguish or purposely analyse, what happens is this. The result of distinction becomes an idea, 1 and, when we will, we have that idea over against a presenta- tion. I have an object A and the idea of variety, the latter present now as the idea of a variety in A, call it A(6c) . And this variety may be general, we may want to make any distinc- tion that we can, or it may be more or less special, call it Ay(bc). Now how will this idea work? It will work first of all obviously by means of Contiguity. Striving to particularise itself the idea of itself accomplished will restore anything connected with that accomplishment. This is the way in which contiguity is known to find means for an end, and there is no need to dwell on it. The idea of A somewhere exhibiting variety leads to restless movement about the whole field of it ; the idea of its showing this or that variety leads to particular search, as when a beast surveys a region for its prey or its enemy. And so far the idea of distinction working by contiguity explains analysis. But there is another side which we noticed when above we spoke of blending, and which this latter process alone, I think, will make clear. When I scrutinise the object of sense or of thought, I find that, on my attention and the presence of my idea, its features grow diverse. It is as if, so to speak, my will had served as a microscope, as if I were turning the screw gold the detail were coming out. And here doubtless, working side by side with contiguity, we have the process of fusion. In the first place the idea gives strength to answering elements (MiND Nos. 43 and 46) which were there and were not noticed, or which come there on fresh presentation when their supports are strengthened. We may think here of the perception of obscure sensations, or again of the action of fixed ideas and moods on the environment. But we have a second case where the variety is produced by our wills. We may illus- trate this by the play of our thought or imagination. I think of a man, and then of a hundred men, and then further I group and divide these hundred men at my pleasure and, as we say, quick as thought. We have blending here which (with contiguity) transforms the picture before us. The suggested features, it is true, do not strengthen given detail, 1 Cp. my remarks on Comparison (MiND No. 41). Mr. Bosanquet criticised these (MiND No. 43) in a way that I found very interesting, and I admit that I was wrong in making alternate subsumption always necessary. In some cases we do without it, but in others I think this is certainly not possible. We cannot always go from A to B with a point of comparison. We may find that first in returning from B to A.