VIII. NOTES AND COKKESPONDENCE.

ON MR. WARD'S " PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES (in.) ". In Mr. Ward's article on Psychological Principles, in the last number of MIND, he illustrates the imperfections of present Psychology, as regards the use of terms, by a copious reference to my modes of expressing the fundamental conceptions of the science. It will be long ere we attain an unimpeachable phraseology for the highest generalities of the mind, and none of us can be too thankful for the criticism that shows us our weak points. At the same time, it is not in human nature to acknowledge errors wholesale, without an attempt at palliation ; and I must endeavour to justify, as far as may be, some at least of the expressions that Mr. Ward refers to. One thing I am free to admit, namely, that in approaching the subject at the commencement, I use a variety of terms that are not strictly denned, and treat as nearly synonymous words that have a real difference of meaning. In the first statement of notions that are new to the reader, it is scarcely possible to preserve exactness ; at all events, there is another condition to be attended to, namely, to be suggestive. It would be well if these two things could be combined perfect propriety in the use of terms, and the suggestion of meanings requisite to some faint compre- hension of the subject-matter. I, for one, however, confess myself unequal to the reconciliation of the two objects. 1 despair of giving an accurate conception of the fundamental constituents of mind at the outset ; I am only too glad if I can give an approximation to begin with, and gradually improve upon the statement, so as to end with just and definite notions of all essential matters. Thus it is, that I take the definition of the wide term Consciousness as the concluding topic of my larger work. Of course, this is a wholly indefensible position, if the vagueness allowed at the outset is maintained all through. I can, however, show that this is not the case with several of Mr. Ward's instances. He is especially severe upon my use of the word ' Sensation ' in the classification of Feelings. He says very truly that I divide Feelings into Pleasurable, Painful and Indifferent, and again into Sensations and Emotions. He asks what is the connexion between these quite distinct classifications. I fail to see the relevancy of the question, inasmuch as any genus may be broken up into species on different lines. The real point of the criticism I take to be, that Sensations are pre-eminently involved with our Intelli- gence, which would seem to make the classification very absurd. Mr. Ward should have done me the justice to remark how careful I am, from the very beginning, to state the double inclusion under Sensations ; not to speak of the whole method of the detailed description, which gives the doubleness an emphasis that can hardly be mistaken. In the Introduction to The Senses and the Intellect, this expression occurs : "Our SENSATIONS, as will be afterwards seen, come partly under Feeling and partly under Thought". Again, in the Introduction to the Manual, which contains some instances of the unqualified use of Sensation, there is this corrective " Sensation, which contains a department of Feeling ". It is this depart- ment that allows Sensations and Emotions to be coupled as exhausting the region of Feeling. These give the sub-genera of Feeling, while the other division exhibits the final classification of the different species of Sensations and Emotions. Thus, among the Sensations of Hearing (Emotional) are included Pleasures, Pains and states of Neutral excitement.