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reality, protection was first attained as an actual result and afterwards perceived to be desirable. Practical results go before theoretical views. The ends are not the causes of development, as is obvious when it is considered that the later stages of development are unknown to the earlier (pp. 179-80). Typically, moral customs are outgrowths from religious ceremonial. That which is rendered to the gods begins to be rendered to powerful men, then to equals, and lastly to men in general; the custom itself all the time undergoing modifications. Afterwards, when customs are re- flected on, they are seen to serve various useful purposes, and are supposed to have been invented or evolved for those purposes. As a matter of fact, the purpose was never thought of until the retrospective period. Again, the exigencies of practical life bring about new modifications of custom. New advantages are there- upon seen to be gained, and the new rules of action are con- sciously followed for the sake of these advantages ; but the end that is now consciously sought was not originally the end. Similarly, a person whose aims are egoistic may find that, through the social interconnexion of all human action, his efforts are productive of public good, and may be stimulated to new exertion by the thought of this good which was not at first consciously aimed at. In all such cases the result is that yet other ends are attained which had not been thought of before. For as soon as the attainment of any class of ends has been realised and they are consciously sought, new changes in practice make possible new views of what is attainable, and so on indefi- nitely. Thus is manifested in social action, along with the law of "the heterogony of ends," the law of "the unlimited growth of forces". The individual reacts on society; but to do this effec- tively it is necessary that he should be the organ of the " general mind" or "will," which has not yet come to full consciousness in others. Merely individual modes of action have little influence. " Individual customs," for example, are either suppressed by the general will or are accepted as "fashion," the least dignified and the most temporary of all forms of custom. A whole series of objections to Prof. Wundt's account of the origin and development of morality may be summed up in a sentence. If, as is said, the theories of " the 'Aufklarung' of the 17th and 18th centuries " ascribed too much rationality to man, or too much influence to reason, does not this modern theory ascribe too little ? Its merit is in the firm grasp that Prof. Wundt has of the fact of the slow social evolution of human habits and modes of thought. At first it seems indeed that he does not see the necessity of explaining social evolution by its causes and con- ditions. He rejects all theories which imply that progress is due to the conscious pursuit of ends ; and of " natural selection " beyond, perhaps, a casual allusion he says nothing. The reason of this is that he has a doctrine of his own, which makes all such explanations superfluous. In his view the evolution of