T. H. GKEEN, PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, II. 99

ing that such judgments as * gold is yellow ' are not merely an analysis of a nominal essence, but express belief in regard to an outward thing. The doctrine, though substantially correct, is however inconsistent w r ith Mill's Lockian metaphysic of the rela- k tion of the mind to reality. In Section B (of Names) it is main- tained that Mill's distinction between singular and general names is more properly a distinction between singular and general pro- positions. Proper names, according to this view, are in themselves mere sounds representing no mental act at all, but "to the person who uses them they are on every occasion on which he uses them specially connotative". Section C attacks Mill's sub- stitution of a classification of existences_Jor_a theory o|. the cate- jgorie.s. a^nd easily shows that the Kantian categories are implicitly assumed in Mill's account. Sections D, F, G, H, are mainly occu- pied, as already mentioned, with Kantian discussions, and with the author's constructive theory. The criticisms passed upon Mill may be easily deduced therefrom, and are of minor interest. In Section I (Syllogism) he comes to closer quarters, with fatal results to Mill's general theory of inference, and his theory of the V^ syllogism in particular. " Is the 'particular' of which an attribute is 7^ asserted in the conclusion one of the particulars which have been ' already observed to have this attribute, or is it not? If it is, then there is no inference to it. ... If it is not, how is the J inference justified? How is the inference valid unless the is /a TrdvTwv ? and if it is * -av-nav^ how is it inference at all ? " (p. 274.) In point of fact, inference has " nothing to do with how often an event happens, but only with the ques- tion what it really is that happens in each event. . . . Once know what death really is in the case of a single man, i.e., the conditions on which it depends, then I learn no more by seeing any number of men die. . . .No doubt, in the process of ascer- taining what these conditions are, a great number of cases may have to be observed in order to the exclusion of unessential cir- cumstances ; but the observation of such cases in order to ascer- tain what really happens, what are the conditions of the given phenomena in each, is absolutely different from the observation which from the constant occurrence of an event leads to the expectation of its continuance " (p. 275). " Inference lies, not (as Mill says) in the generalisation from observed instances to all, but I (a) in the discovery of the real conditions of the observed instances; (6) in the discovery whether other apparently like instances are J really like. Given the real similarity of the other instances, there is no inference to them " (p. 277). In the following section, K, the same line of thought is applied to Mill's account of Induction. " The whole business of science," it is well said, " is to substitute real identity (identity of conditions) for mere similarity between phenomena." Mill's confusion in regard to the axiom of the uniformity of nature (better named, according to Green, " the unity of the world ") is successfully exposed. In the old contro-