98 CRITICAL NOTICES :

intelligible character. Kant tends, according to Green, to identify freedom, with determination by reason, though he " scarcely seems fully to realise his own identification " (p. 119). Green also points out a variation on Kant's part in the use of the term Will. Using it at first in the generic sense, which includes the good and the bad, the heteronomous as well as the autonomous, will, he came in his later moral writings to use it in the specific sense of the rational will, opposing it in this sense to ' Willkuhr '. On pp. 147 onwards, we have an interesting discussion as to the sense in which it is true to say of the law that it is self-imposed, and as to how far the recognition of it as self-imposed is present, or indeed desirable, in the unsophisticated man. The first part of the dis- cussion again raises the question of the relation of the human to the divine consciousness. The logical division of the volume is in some respects less valu- able than it might otherwise have been, from Green's inveterate habit of going back to fundamentals. Thus in the first section on " The Logic of the Formal Logicians," i.e., Hamilton, Mansel, &c., we are soon led away from the immediate subject and find ourselves in the midst of the proof, so familiar to us in Green, of the thought-constituted nature of reality. In another respect, however, this section is specially interesting from the embarrass- ment which facts of feeling as such evidently cause to Green's theory. " Undoubtedly," he says, " there is something other than thought. Feeling is so " (p. 181). " The world before there was sentient life was not what it is to us as sentient ; the world of conditions of feeling is not to intelligence (even our intelligence) what it is to us as feeling " (p. 180). " We have admitted that the sensitive act is other than any such relation as thought con- stitutes, and that it is necessary to the reality of the natural thing. It is an event in time, and, as such, the absolute e-repov to self-contained thought " (p. 187). Then arises- the same difficulty which we had before in reference to the pure thought of the uni- versal consciousness. " Can relation to sense, as a fact or reality/' he asks in a note, " exist for a consciousness not sensitive ? If not, how do facts of nature exist for God? " " Is not the notion," he answers in the text, " that an event in the way of sensation is something over and above its conditions, a mistake of ours, arising from the fact that we feel before we know what the reality of the feeling is, and hence continue to fancy that the feeling really is something apart from its conditions ? . . . For the only sort of consciousness for which there is reality the conceived conditions are the reality " (pp. 190-1). But if so, what becomes of the reality and otherness formerly admitted to belong to feeling qua feeling as a fact in rerum naturd ? From the half-problematic form of this answer, Green would seem to be but indifferently satisfied with his own solution. / In criticising Mill's Logic, Green takes up first the question of V the Import of Propositions, concluding that Mill is right in hold-