VI. CKITICAL NOTICES.

Works of THOMAS HILL GREEN, late Fellow of Balliol College, and Why te's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University* of Oxford. Edited by E. L. NETTLESHIP, Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. Vol. II. Philosophical Works. London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1886. Pp. xliv. 552. This second volume of Green's works is of much greater inte- rest than the one which preceded it, from the fact that it consists entirely of matter not hitherto published. It is made up of selec- tions from Green's drafts of his tutorial and professorial lectures in Oxford subsequent to 1874 (the date of the Introductions to Hume). The contents of the volume fall into three main divi- sions, the first consisting of "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant" (both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Moral Theory), the second of " Lectures on I/ogic." or rather perhaps on the philo- sophy of logic, and the third, which is also the longest, of " Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation". The second part is mainly taken up with criticism of Mill and dovetails at many points into the lectures on Kant. Sections D, F, G, H, for example, on verbal and real propositions, space and geometrical truth, time, demonstration and necessary truth, ought to be read in connexion with the Kantian discussions on analytical and synthetical judgments, the forms of perception, the distinction between ' outer ' and ' inner ' sense, and the ' empirical reality * of time. The third division treats, as its title indicates, of " the moral grounds on which the State is based, and upon which obedience to the law of the state is justified". Partly historico- critical, these lectures are in the main constructive, and contain, in effect, a theory cf the State. The concrete and practical inte- rest of the subject was specially calculated to stimulate Green's powers, and this third division of the volume will probably be found the freshest and most valuable, not to say the most in- teresting, part of the book. But we are no further concerned with it in the present notice. The papers here printed do not pretend to offer a continuous ex- position of Kant's theoretical philosophy; they are valuable rather for the criticism which they contain of some of Kant's prominent but often misleading distinctions. That between outer and inner sense, for example, is carefully dealt with in several places. In another case the division of truths into necessary and contingent Green points out that, while it is of course true that sense as sense can yield no necessity, there exists, on a true view of nature as constituted by thought relations, no such absolute distinction as Kant makes out between the truths of geometry and other scientific truths. This is instructively worked out in Sections F