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and instance ". " Example " is perhaps a safer rendering for jrapd8eiy[j,a (Beispiel) always ; " instance " might suggest eWrao-ts to the unwary student. It is a pity that in giving the references to other portions of Zeller's Philosophy of the Greeks the translators have not given them to the volumes and pages of the English version (except, of course, in cases where the passage referred to occurs only in later German editions than that from which the English version was made). Dr. Zeller's work on Aristotle is too well known to require any special criticism or commendation now. It is in any case indispensable to the student and will probably not soon be superseded. An unfortunate error in the translation of a phrase in the "Will" which Diogenes Laertius gives as Aristotle's may provoke the scorn of the Greek scholar, but does not detract from the general learning and soundness of judgment which the veteran historian of Greek philosophy everywhere displays. By an error which he shares with (or borrows from) Grote, Zeller translates oi/ may be used, as by Plato, for images of human beings as well as of animals. In discussing the problem of the present condition of the Aristotelian writings, Zeller seems too lightly to put aside the theory that " our Aristotle " may consist largely of notes taken by pupils at the Master's lectures. The theory does not exclude those which Zeller adopts. May not such books at least as the Ethics and Politics be a combination of (1) Aristotle's own notes for his lectures and for treatises he intended to write, (2) finished monographs on special points (e.g., the Essay " On Friendship " Eth. Nic., viii., ix.), and (3) notes taken by his pupils, and used by his editors, as, e.g., by Hegel's, to supplement the material he left behind him ? Zeller's discussion of the phrase TO ri rfv eti/m (Transl., i., pp. 217-219, note} seems less clear than that of Schwegler (in his edition of the Metaphysics}, with which on the whole it appears to agree. It is hardly quite fair to Aristotle to say, as Zeller does (Transl., i., p. 239), that he ignores the so-called fourth syllogistic figure of later logic, without add- ing that Aristotle (Anal. Pr., i., 7, 29 a 19 seq.) did recognise the only moods of it (Fesapo and Fresison of mediaeval logic) which are anything more than awkwardly expressed moods of the first figure. There is a curiously inaccurate sentence (quite correctly rendered by the translators) hi the account of Aristotle's Ethics : " Now the activity of reason, in so far as it is rightly performed, we call Virtue " (Transl., ii., p. 142), Virtue, according to Aristotle, is not an eVe'pyeia : that is the principal reason why it is not the chief good. Zeller's sentence suggests a con- fusion (into which he does not mean to fall) between ' Virtue ' and (vdaipovia. Zeller (Transl., ii., p. 128) seems hardly just to Aristotle's admirable account of the combination of reason and appetite in ' Will ' ; but that is a matter which would require a long discussion. On details of this sort one may differ from Zeller or prefer the views of other interpreters of ' the philosopher '. But, if we look at the work as a whole, it is impossible not to admire its wide learning, its philo- sophical grasp, and above all its unvarying sobriety in judgment. Of this last quality it may be worth while to give three characteristic ex- amples. In vol. i., p. 260, note, Zeller quotes approvingly G. H. Lewes's favourable opinion of Aristotle's observations of animal life ; but he adds " All the more odd is it that Lewes should complain of Aristotle's failure to mention (in speaking of the cephalopods) the freshness of the sea- breeze, the play of the waves, etc. This is to blame Aristotle for not

having the bad taste to drop from the realism of a zoological description