538 D. G. EITCHIE :
take a medical "maxim" such as " A dry diet is good for all".
This maxim is capable of analysis into two propositions :
" (1) All men are benefited (2) All dry food is good for
by dry food ; men ".
But if a practical application of this maxim is to be made, i.e., a
recognition that some particular act (a " this ") is to be done
by some particular person (an "I"), there must be two minor
premises :
" (1) I am a man ; (2) This is dry food ".
If either of these should be forgotten or left out of sight, the con-
clusion " I am benefited by this " will not be drawn. Only when
this conclusion is in the mind and actively present in consciousness
(cvepyei) will conduct be affected. If, therefore, either of the minor
premises is not in the mind or not actively present in conscious-
ness (dXX' et roSe roidvSe, 77 OVK l^et 17 OVK eWpyet), the practical COn-
clusion fails to be drawn. Aristotle does not mean to regard this
leaving out of sight of a particular as an " innocent mistake in
application " (as Mr. Fairbrother supposes, p. 365). Ignorance of
the particular excuses (iii., 1, 15, 1110 b 30), but not carelessness
about the particular or neglect of it. It is a pity that Mr. Stewart
has illustrated vii., 3, 6 by a case of ignorance (that sherry con-
tains acid) and not by a case of the non-application of knowledge.
Of course either ignorance of the minor premise or forgetfulness
of it will prevent the conclusion being drawn ; but it is the forget-
fulness which is relevant to the explanation of dicpao-ia. In the
practical syllogism of Eth., vi., 7, 7 (1141 b 18), ignorance of the
minor premise is to the point: in vii., 3, 6, ignoring or not
applying the minor is the explanation of aKpaaia. If genuine
ignorance could be proved, the person would not be blamed. The
a.KpaT^vyrj. Pursuit of this, avoid-
ance of that are treated for convenience of analysis as equivalent
to the propositions "This is good," "That is bad". Aristotle
must not be understood to hold the absurd view that there is no
syllogism unless the premises are clearly formulated in words.
SvAAoytor/xos means simply "inference," "conclusion". Thus,
wherever a principle (apx^ = major premise) can be found in a
particular action, wherever at least actions are due to conceptions
of ends (cf. De An., iii., 11, 434 a 5, seq.), the action admits of
analysis as a syllogism with a universal major and a singular
minor, or as a series of syllogisms in which the conclusion is
always more particular than the major premise.
TOIOVTOV TO roiovbf Trpdrrftv, and the minor as on Tc8e TO vvv rotwSe,