perceiueth them well, neither doe thoſe things greatly mooue my mind:, which onely haue a colour and ſhadowed ſhowe of truth, being ſet out with ſlanting pride, and glory of words, but yet truth haue they none.

Thou art farre wide Axiochus, and reaſoneſt vnskilfully, ioyning the feeling of euill, with the wante of good things, forgetting thy ſelfe that then thou ſhalt bee in the number of the ſence eſſe dead. For him indeed which is bereft of all good things, dooth the contrary force of euill things greatly vexe. But he which hath no being, can take nor feele nothing, in place of thoſe things whereof he is deſpoiled. Then by what reaſon can any griefe bee conceyued of that thing, which breedeth no ſence nor perſeuerance of any thing which hurteth. For if in the beginning O Axiochus, thou didſt not, thought indeed in vayne, ioyne ſence and feeling to death, moſt vnwiſely, thou ſhouldeſt neuer had cauſe to feare death. But now thou doeſt confound thy ſelfe, and ſpeakeſt contrane to thy ſelfe, oft fearing that thou ſhalt bee depriued of ſoule and ſence together, and oft thinking that with thy ſence thou ſhalt feele that thing, whereof there is no ſence nor feeling. And to this purpoſe do all thoſe excellent