here, where כּעס and מכאוב express not merely bodily suffering, but also mental grief. Spinoza hits one side of the matter in his Ethics, IV 17, where he remarks: “Veram boni et mali cognitionem saepe non satis valere ad cupiditates coercendas, quo facto homo imbecillitatem suam animadvertens cogitur exclamare: Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.” In every reference, not merely in that which is moral, there is connected with knowledge the shadow of a sorrowful consciousness, in spite of every effort to drive it away. The wise man gains an insight into the thousand-fold woes of the natural world, and of the world of human beings, and this reflects itself in him without his being able to change it; hence the more numerous the observed forms of evil, suffering, and discord, so much greater the sadness (כּעס, R. כס, cogn. הס, perstringere) and the heart-sorrow (מכאוב, crève-cour) which the inutility of knowledge occasions. The form of 18a is like Ecc 5:6, and that of 18b like e.g., Pro 18:22. We change the clause veyosiph daath into an antecedent, but in reality the two clauses stand together as the two members of a comparison: if one increaseth knowledge, he increaseth (at the same time) sorrow. “יוסיף, Isa 29:14; Isa 38:5; Ecc 2:18,” says Ewald, §169a, “stands alone as a part. act., from the stem reverting from Hiph. to Kal with י instead of  .” But this is not unparalleled; in הן יוסיף the verb יוסף is fin., in the same manner as יסּד, Isa 28:16; תּומיך, Psa 16:5, is Hiph., in the sense of amplificas, from ימך; יפיח, Pro 6:19 (vid., l.c.), is an attribut. clause, qui efflat, used as an adj.; and, at least, we need to suppose in the passage before us the confusion that the ē of kātēl (from kātil, originally kātal), which is only long, has somehow passed over into î. Böttcher's remark to the contrary, “An impersonal fiens thus repeated is elsewhere altogether without a parallel,” is set aside by the proverb formed exactly thus: “He that breathes the love of truth says what is right,” Pro 12:17.

Chap. 2