Substitution box

In cryptography, a S-Box (Substitution-box) is a basic component of symmetric-key algorithms. In block ciphers, the S-Boxes are used to make the relation between the key and the ciphertext (coded text) difficult to understand–Shannon's property of confusion. The S-Boxes are carefully chosen to resist cryptanalysis (decoding).

In general, an S-Box takes some number of input bits, m, and transforms them into some number of output bits, n: an m×n S-Box can be implemented as a lookup table with 2m words of n bits each. Fixed tables are normally used, as in the Data Encryption Standard (DES), but in some ciphers the tables are generated dynamically from the key; e.g. the Blowfish and the Twofish encryption algorithms. Bruce Schneier describes IDEA's modular multiplication step as a key-dependent S-Box.

One good example is this 6×4-bit S-Box from DES (S5):

S5Middle (inner) 4 bits of input
0000000100100011010001010110011110001001101010111100110111101111
Outer bits 00 0010110001000001011110101011011010000101001111111101000011101001
01 1110101100101100010001111101000101010000111110100011100110000110
10 0100001000011011101011010111100011111001110001010110001100001110
11 1011100011000111000111100010110101101111000010011010010001010011

Given a 6-bit input, the 4-bit output is found by selecting the row using the outer two bits, and the column using the inner four bits. For example, an input "011011" has outer bits "01" and inner bits "1101"; the corresponding output would be "1001".

The 8 S-Boxes of DES were the subject of intensive studies for many years cause of a concern that a method of bypassing the DES cipher to obtaining access to the plaintext–a vulnerability (susceptibility) known only to its designers–might have been planted (inserted) in the cipher. In 1994, the S-Box design criteria were finally published by its designers after the public rediscovery of differential cryptanalysis, showing that they had been carefully tuned the design to increase resistance against differential cryptanalysis attacks. Other research had already indicated that even a very small modification to one of the 8 S-Box used by the DES could weaken it very much.

The design of good S-Boxes was the subject of a great amount of research; now much more is understood about their use in block ciphers than when the DES S-Boxes were released.

References

  • Kaisa Nyberg (1991). "Perfect nonlinear S-boxes" (PDF). Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT '91. Brighton. pp. 378–386. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-09-26. Retrieved 2007-02-20.
  • Don Coppersmith (1994). "The Data Encryption Standard (DES) and its strength against attacks" (PDF). IBM Journal of Research and Development. 38 (3): 243–250. doi:10.1147/rd.383.0243. Retrieved 2007-02-20.
  • S. Mister and C. Adams (1996). "Practical S-Box Design". Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC '96) Workshop Record. Queens University. pp. 61–76. Archived from the original (PostScript) on 2006-08-31. Retrieved 2007-02-20.
  • Schneier, Bruce (1996). Applied Cryptography, Second Edition. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 296–298, 349. ISBN 0-471-11709-9.

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