1821 map of the heavily fortified city of Valletta, Malta and its two harbours (Grand Harbour and Marsamxett), an important Royal Navy base in the 19th and 20th centuries

Imperial fortress was the designation given in the British Empire to four colonies that were located in strategic positions from each of which Royal Navy squadrons could control the surrounding regions and,[1] between them, much of the planet.[2]

History

The Imperial fortresses provided not only safe harbours and (with the advent of steam propulsion) coal stores within the area of operation, but also Royal Naval Dockyards where ships of the squadrons could be repaired or maintained without requiring their return to a dockyard in the British Isles.[3][4]

The Imperial fortresses were also locations where military stores were stockpiled and numbers of soldiers sufficient not only for local defence, but also to provide expeditionary forces to work with the Royal Navy in amphibious campaigns and raids on coasts throughout the regions, could be garrisoned.[5][6]

These Imperial fortresses originally included:[7][8]

They were the lynch pins in Britain's domination of the oceans and the Mediterranean and Caribbean seas, including its ability to deny safe passage to enemy naval and merchant vessels while protecting its own merchant trade, as well as to its projection of superior naval and military force anywhere on the planet. Their strategic importance made Imperial fortresses somewhat immune to the British Government's usual policy of pinching pennies on defence, often by lumbering local governments and taxpayers with the cost of local defence though this was an area of governance not delegated to local government's control. As recorded by the Canadian Director of the Naval Historical Section G. N. Tucker (in "The Naval Service of Canada: its Official History")[9] in 1952:

The conference sat in London from April 4 until May 9, 1887 — the year of the Queen's first jubilee. In his opening address Lord Salisbury disavowed any wish to raise at that conference the question of imperial federation. The British Government reiterated its earlier-established position that land defences, generally speaking, were the responsibility of the colony concerned. Nearly half the meetings of the conference were devoted to the subject of naval defence, especially that of the Australian colonies. The British Government postulated a strong navy, free to operate anywhere. In order that the Royal Navy might in practice be ubiquitous, it was essential that certain bases and coaling stations should be provided with shore defences. "In addition to the Imperial fortresses Malta, Gibraltar, Bermuda, and Halifax, it would seem necessary to defend on an adequate scale, Cape Town and Simon's Bay, St. Helena, Sierra Leone, Port Louis (Mauritius), Aden, Colombo (Ceylon), Singapore, Hong Kong, Port Royal (Jamaica), Port Castries (St. Lucia), and Esquimalt, in addition to minor coaling stations . . ." The imperial fortresses would remain a responsibility of the United Kingdom; but in the case of certain colonies in which local as well as imperial interests seemed to require that naval bases be maintained, the government of the United Kingdom thought that the cost should be shared, and to this arrangement the governments of Hong Kong, Mauritius, Singapore, and Ceylon, had already agreed. The British Government also announced that arrangements had been made to facilitate the employment of British officers by the various colonial governments.

Map of the cruises of the Bermuda-based HMS York on the America & West Indies Station, 1936-1939

Halifax and Bermuda controlled the transatlantic sea lanes between North America and Europe, and were placed to dominate the Atlantic seaboard of the United States (as demonstrated during the American War of 1812 when the squadron of the Royal Navy's North America Station maintained a blockade of the Atlantic coast of the United States and launched the Chesapeake Campaign from Bermuda, defeating American forces at Bladensburg, burning Washington, DC, and raiding Alexandria, Virginia, before ultimately being defeated at Baltimore and forced to withdrawn back to Bermuda),[10][11][12][13][14] as well as to control the western Atlantic Ocean from the Arctic to the West Indies (in the twentieth century, the Bermuda-based North America and West Indies Station of the Royal Navy, as the North America Station had been re-named after absorbing the Jamaica Station in 1830, would become the 'America and West Indies Station', its area growing to include the western South Atlantic and the Atlantic coast of South America, as well the Pacific coast from Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic). In 1828,[15] Royal Navy Purser Richard Otter (or Cotter) wrote of Bermuda:

The possession of Bermuda, as the key of all our Western Colonies, is of the first importance to England, for if a foe of any maritime strength had possession of it, our trade would be exposed to much annoyance, if not total destruction.

Gibraltar controlled passage between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, and Malta, aside from supporting operations in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, served as a base for naval and military forces that would be able to deploy relatively quickly to the Indian and Pacific Oceans once the Suez Canal was completed in 1869.

Halifax ceased to be an Imperial fortress in stages. With the 1867 confederation of the Dominion of Canada (under which all of the colonies of the British Empire's administrative region of British North America, except Bermuda and Newfoundland, were "federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom ..."),[16][17] military defence of Canada would be transferred to the militia of the dominion government, and the British Army withdrew most of its establishment from the continent, leaving small military garrisons to defend the Royal Naval Dockyard at Halifax, Nova Scotia and the Esquimalt Royal Navy Dockyard in British Columbia. These garrisons were withdrawn along with the Royal Navy establishments when the two Canadian dockyards were closed in 1905, then sold to the government of the dominion.

The lack of such an Imperial fortress in the region of Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean was always to be a weakness throughout the nineteenth century (the British Government, ever unwilling to increase, or even maintain,[18][19] its defence expenditure, relied on there being few nations outside of the Atlantic and its connected seas that possessed fleets capable of threatening British trade or territories, though the nascent United States of America were multiplying towards the Pacific coast of North America, and the Russian Empire and Japanese Empire both had ports on the Pacific and were keen to build large, modern fleets).

America and West Indies Station 1st Division (HMS Dragon, HMS Danae and HMS Despatch) off Admiralty House in 1931 as they depart their base at the Royal Naval Dockyard in Bermuda to exercise on the open North Atlantic

As Britain had no base comparable to an Imperial fortress in East Africa, Mauritius, India, Ceylon, Malaysia, Hong Kong, British Columbia or Australasia, after the 1869 completion of the Suez Canal Britain relied on Malta in the Mediterranean Sea to project power over this vast expanse. When the Panama Canal opened in 1914, Britain was able to rely on amity and common interests between herself and the United States during and after the First World War, to also use Bermuda, from which cruisers could patrol the Pacific coasts of North, Central, and South America. Finally the rising power and increasing belligerence of the Japanese empire after the First World War (The Imperial Japanese Navy was the third largest navy in the world by 1920, behind the Royal Navy and the United States Navy) would result in the construction of the Singapore Naval Base, which was completed in 1938, less than four years before hostilities with Japan commenced during the Second World War.

The need to protect these bases of operation, as well as to prevent, via their captures, their becoming bases of similar utility to an enemy (with ownership of land by foreigners, at least in Bermuda, barred in order to deny a pretext for invasion),[20] each was heavily defended, making fortress an apt designation. "Fortress" was often included when giving the names of these colonies, e.g. "Fortress Bermuda".[21] Bermuda, protected by an almost impassable barrier reef and unconnected to any continent, required the least defences, but was heavily garrisoned and armed with coastal artillery batteries.[22][23][24] Defence of Bermuda, and of the region, was greatly weakened by the economic austerity that followed the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and the American War of 1812, which resulted in drastic reductions to the regular forces and to Reserve Forces in the British Isles (Militia, Volunteer Force, and Fencibles), and in Bermuda (Militia and volunteer artillery), being allowed to lapse. Bermuda's garrison would slowly increase, with the threat of invasion by the United States during and after the American Civil War resulting in further strengthening of the defences. Bermuda's importance to Imperial defence was only increasing, however, and the parlous state of its own defence was commented upon by Sir Henry Hardinge in the House of Commons on the 22 March 1839:

Such were some of the reasons why it appeared to him, that her Majesty's forces should be increased. He might go to other stations Bermuda for instance. All who were conversant with the interests of our West Indian and North American possessions must know that Bermuda was one of our most important posts—a station where the navy could be refitted with the greatest ease, where during the last war we had about 2,000,000l. value in stores, where our ships (such was the safety of the anchorage) could at all times take refuge. This island had been fortified at very great expense; for some years 5,000 convicts had been engaged on the works, and it was most important in every point of view that this island should be maintained in a state of perfect security. For a long time even after the determination of the sympathisers in the United States to attack us had been known, the force at Bermuda was never greater than a small battalion of 480 or 500 men, perfectly inadequate to do the duties of the station. Considering that this post was one of great consequence, that immense sums had been expended upon it, and that the efficiency of the navy in those seas was chiefly to be secured by means of it, it was indispensable, that it should be in safe keeping. To what quarter were they to look for further reinforcements, should they be needed, to increase our army in America, in the event of the dispute between New Brunswick and Maine becoming more serious? Not to the West Indies, from which two battalions had already been withdrawn. Not to the Canadas, for communication between these provinces and New Brunswick was impracticable, separated as they were by a wilderness of 400 or 500 miles. In the other colonies every man was required. From the Ionian Islands not one could be spared, from Malta not one. From Gibraltar, perhaps, one battalion more could be squeezed, if they could bring themselves to inflict great additional hardship on the troops now in garrison there, It really appeared to him absolutely necessary, that Government should look to the state of the army—should fairly consider the amount of work done by it, and apply themselves to the question, whether it was their duty to increase the military force.

[25]

Halifax was much more vulnerable to attack than Bermuda, which might come over land or water from the United States, Gibraltar was vulnerable to overland attack by Spain (which remains anxious to recover it) and by Napoleonic France, and both Gibraltar and Malta were much more vulnerable to the navies of the Mediterranean (notably those of Spain, France, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire),[26] and were even more heavily defended.

Imperial fortresses of the British Empire

Bermuda

Halifax, Nova Scotia

Gibraltar

Malta

See also

References

  1. Stranack, Royal Navy, Lieutenant-Commander B. Ian D (1977). The Andrew and The Onions: The Story of The Royal Navy in Bermuda, 1795–1975. Bermuda: Island Press Ltd. ISBN 9780921560036.
  2. Young, Douglas MacMurray (1961). The Colonial Office in The Early Nineteenth Century. London: Published for the Royal Commonwealth Society by Longmans. p. 55.
  3. Keith, Arthur Berriedale (1909). Responsible Government in The Dominions. London: Stevens and Sons Ltd. p. 5.
  4. May, CMG, Royal Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Edward Sinclair (1903). Principles and Problems of Imperial Defence. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. p. 145.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  5. Willock USMC, Lieutenant-Colonel Roger (1988). Bulwark Of Empire: Bermuda's Fortified Naval Base 1860–1920. Bermuda: The Bermuda Maritime Museum Press. ISBN 9780921560005.
  6. Gordon, Donald Craigie (1965). The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914. Baltimore, Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins Press. p. 14.
  7. MacFarlane, Thomas (1891). Within the Empire; An Essay on Imperial Federation. Ottawa: James Hope & Co. p. 29.
  8. Alan Lennox-Boyd, The Secretary of State for the Colonies (2 February 1959). "MALTA (LETTERS PATENT) BILL". Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Parliament of the United Kingdom: House of Commons. col. 37.
  9. Tucker, Gilbert Norman (1952). The Naval Service of Canada: its Official History, Volume I: Origins and Early Years. Ottawa: Published by the King's Printer, Ottawa under the authority of the Minister of National Defence (Government of Canada). Pages 69 and 70.
  10. Harris, Dr. Edward Cecil (21 January 2012). "Bermuda's role in the Sack of Washington". The Royal Gazette. City of Hamilton, Pembroke, Bermuda. Retrieved 8 August 2021.
  11. Grove, Tim (22 January 2021). "Fighting The Power". Chesapeake Bay Magazine. Annapolis: Chesapeake Bay Media, LLC. Retrieved 8 August 2021.
  12. Kennedy, R.N., Captain W. R. (1 July 1885). "An Unknown Colony: Sport, Travel and Adventure in Newfoundland and the West Indies". Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine. William Blackwood & Sons. p. 111.
  13. VERAX, (anonymous) (1 May 1889). "The Defense of Canada. (From Colburn's United Service Magazine)". The United Service: A Quarterly Review of Military and Naval Affairs. LR Hamersly & Co. p. 552.
  14. Dawson, George M.; Sutherland, Alexander (1898). MacMillan's Geographical Series: Elementary Geography of the British Colonies. London: MacMillan and Co. p. 184.
  15. OTTER (or COTTER), PURSER, R. N., RICHARD (1828). SKETCHES OF BERMUDA, OR SOMERS' ISLANDS. London: EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE, AND SOLD BY ALL BOOKSELLERS; ALSO BY THE PRINCIPAL MAP AND CHART SELLERS. 1828. PRINTED BY PLUMMER AND BREWIS, LOVE LANE, EASTCHEAP.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  16. "British North America Act 1867: Section Introduction", legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives, 1867, 1867 c. 3 (s. Introduction), retrieved 23 September 2023
  17. "British North America Act 1867: Section Introduction", legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives, 1867, 1867 c. 3 (s. Introduction), retrieved 23 September 2023
  18. "Local Jottings (first item)". The Royal Gazette. City of Hamilton, Pembroke Parish, Bermuda. 27 March 1928. p. 5. In the statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty to Parliament explanatory of the naval estimates, appeared the following: —
    During the past year the limits of the North America and West Indies Station have been extended to include South America, and the Station has been renamed the "America and West Indies Station". In order to meet the requirements of the enlarged station it has been decided to augment this squadron by the transfer of H.M.S. Dauntless from the Mediterranean. This addition will make it possible for the British flag to be shown in South American waters more regularly than has been the case since the withdrawal of the South American squadron for financial reasons in 1921.
  19. "Local Jottings (second item)". The Royal Gazette. City of Hamilton, Pembroke Parish, Bermuda. 27 March 1928. p. 5. This is enlarged upon in a later issue of the Times, which says:—
    Further opportunity for visits of British warships to South American ports will be provided by the decision, announced in the First Lord's Memorandum, to augment the Eighth Cruiser Squadron by the transfer of H.M.S. Dauntless from the Mediterranean. Since the withdrawal of the South American Squadron in 1921, the British flag has been shown in this part of the world in two ways, one by the calls of special ships, such as the Repulse, with the Prince of Wales, in 1925, and the First Cruiser Squadron in the course of its world cruise, in 1924; and the other by detaching a ship from what has hitherto been called the North American Station. The limits of this Station have now been extended to include South America, and the addition of a cruiser will enable visits to he made in the lower half of the Station without interfering with the annual programme of ships in the upper half.
  20. "Abstract of proceedings of the Honourable House of Assembly Wednesday 9 July, 1890". The Royal Gazette. City of Hamilton, Pembroke, Bermuda. 15 July 1890. p. 1. Her Majority's Government does not deem it expedient to admit foreigners to the privileges of acquiring land in so small a Colony which has been converted at such vast expense into an Imperial fortress and coaling station as the defence of these islands might be materially affected thereby and for this reason it has been deemed necessary in granting certificates of naturalization under the provisions of Act No. 11 of 1857 to except the capacity to take or hold freehold land
  21. METEOROLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS AT THE FOREIGN AND COLONIAL STATIONS OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS AND THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1852—1886. London: Meteorological Council. HMSO. 1890.
  22. "World Heritage List: Historic Town of St George and Related Fortifications, Bermuda". UNESCO. Retrieved 28 July 2021.
  23. Ingham-Hind, Jennifer M. (1992). Defence, Not Defiance: A History Of The Bermuda Volunteer Rifle Corps. Bermuda: The Island Press. ISBN 0969651716.
  24. Harris, Edward C. (1997). Bermuda Forts 1612–1957. Bermuda: The Bermuda Maritime Museum Press. ISBN 9780921560111.
  25. Sir Henry Hardinge, MP for Launceston (22 March 1839). "SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES". Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Vol. 46. Parliament of the United Kingdom: House of Commons. col. 1141–1142.
  26. Holland, James (1 September 2003). Fortress Malta: An Island Under Siege 1940-1943. New York City: Miramax Books. ISBN 9781401351861.
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